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It’s Not Just About the Contents: 
Searching for a Neural Correlate of a 
State of Consciousness
A Commentary on Wolf Singer
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Global gamma band synchronisation is perhaps the most extensively studied can-
didate for a Neural Correlate of Consciousness (NCC). Yet despite numerous stud-
ies confirming its association with consciousness, it seems to be neither sufficient
nor necessary for the presence of all subjective experiences. Analysis of gamma
synchronisation studies suggests that it is a correlate of the initial binding of ex-
pected, attended, task-dependent contents of consciousness, whereas task-irrelev-
ant contents do not seem to require gamma synchronisation. While discovery of
such a content-related NCC is a remarkable achievement for the neurophysiolo-
gical research of consciousness, it does not fully explain some of the fundamental
structural properties of consciousness, namely the temporal and spatial integra-
tion of all available experiences into a coherent stream of consciousness. As an
alternative, instead of focusing solely on the selected contents of consciousness,
the neural mechanisms of the fundamental properties of consciousness could be
studied by contrasting states of (un)consciousness. Recent research into the states
of consciousness suggests that, for instance, informational complexity is a highly
sensitive  predictor  of  the  presence of  consciousness,  possibly  reflecting back-
ground structural properties of the unity of subjective experiences. As a limiting
factor, though, such a state-related NCC does not seem to reflect the phenomenal
diversity of the contents of consciousness. Arguably, these limitations could be
overcome by devising experimental setups that would simultaneously probe the
neural correlates of the contents and the state of consciousness.
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1 Introduction
Even though the search for the neural correlates
of consciousness is still an unresolved challenge
of astonishing complexity (Crick 1994), the con-
tinuous efforts to crack the mystery are not ex-
pended in vain. Each year brings an increasing
number of cognitive neuroscientific studies that
reveal  yet  another  piece  of  the  puzzle  of  the
neural basis of subjective experience. However,
it often seems that individual findings are too
diverse and sparse to form a coherent picture.
In addition to the fundamental problem of the
binding of conscious experiences (Singer 2001),
we increasingly face the problem of how to bind
the  findings  of  consciousness-related  studies.
The present target paper by Prof. Wolf Singer
serves such a discovery-binding function, bring-
Noreika, V. (2015). It’s Not Just About the Contents: Searching for a Neural Correlate of a State of Consciousness - A Commentary on Wolf Singer.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 36(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570504 1 | 12
www.open-mind.net
ing very diverse findings into a unified picture
of how the neural correlates with the subjective.
In an impressively erudite manner,  Singer
(this collection) integrates a very broad range of
anatomical and functional findings of the organ-
isational principles of the brain, concluding that
the high-level cognitive functions are supported
by densely coupled, recurrent neural networks,
interacting  under  the  principles  of  non-linear
dynamics. In the proposed framework, percep-
tion is treated as an active process, whose self-
organisation  is  initially  determined  by  genes,
and later modified by post-natal development,
learning, social interactions, and cultural influ-
ences. At the neuronal networks level, high-level
integration  and  communication  are  achieved
through synchronisation of oscillations in differ-
ent  electroencephalography  (EEG)  frequency
bands,  the  most  notable  of  which  is  gamma
band  (>30Hz)  synchronisation  (Engel et  al.
1999).  Given that  an association between the
widespread  gamma-band  synchronisation  and
conscious awareness is found in rather different
experimental paradigms, such as visual masking
(Melloni et  al. 2007),  binocular rivalry (Does-
burg et al. 2009), and attentional blink (Gross
et al. 2004), gamma synchronisation is often re-
garded  as  the  main  NCC (Singer this collec-
tion). 
Yet the candidature of gamma synchron-
isation as the correlate of consciousness is chal-
lenged by some findings from research into the
behavioural states of the brain. If gamma-range
activity correlates with consciousness, it should
diminish  when  consciousness  ceases.  Contrary
to this, gamma band activity seems to increase
rather than decrease in response to certain gen-
eral anaesthetics, such as ketamine (Steriade et
al. 1996). Furthermore, gamma synchronisation
seems  to  be  absent  in  some  conscious  brain
states. For instance, it has been reported that
large-scale neocortical gamma-band coherence is
virtually  absent  during  rapid  eye  movement
(REM) sleep in cats (Castro et al. 2013), a state
typically marked by the most intense dreaming
in humans (Hobson et al. 2000) as well as in fe-
lids (Jouvet 1979). 
The target paper briefly mentions neural
mechanisms supporting overall brain states, but
dismisses them as modulatory systems that are
too general to be considered the NCC (Singer
this collection).  In  the  following,  I  will  argue
that  the relation between the neural  mechan-
isms of the contents and states of consciousness
is not straightforward, and that the puzzle of
the neural mechanisms of consciousness cannot
be  completed  without  studying  the  neural
mechanisms of conscious states. 
2 Contents vs. states of consciousness
An important  distinction  in  consciousness  re-
search is that between the contents and a state
of consciousness (Chalmers 2000). The concept
of the contents of consciousness refers to indi-
vidual subjective experiences that occur in phe-
nomenal consciousness, such as reading a word
or hearing birdsong, and as such they are some-
times referred to as the phenomenal contents of
consciousness (Revonsuo 2006). Most neural ex-
periments  on  consciousness,  especially  in  the
dominant field of visual awareness studies, are
concerned with the neural basis of such specific
contents of consciousness, i.e., they select one or
two  subjective  experiences  within  an  overall
stream of consciousness. In this type of experi-
ment, participants may be presented with stim-
uli close to their perceptual threshold (Del Cul
et al. 2009) or they may be instructed to ob-
serve ambiguous stimuli that may lead to per-
ception of  several  alternating contents of  con-
sciousness (Kornmeier & Bach 2012). The brain
responses  are  then  contrasted  between  trials
that differ in awareness of these stimuli. Not-
ably, while participants in such experiments re-
port  being  unaware  of  some contents  of  con-
sciousness,  they  still  maintain  awareness  of
other experiences: such as seeing the edges of a
computer screen, hearing the background noise
of  the  Magnetic  Resonance  Imaging  (MRI)
scanner, or letting their thoughts wander away
from the experimental task. Typically, such ex-
periences  are  ignored  as  task-irrelevant,  and
consequently the so-called “unaware” or “uncon-
scious” trials still bear very rich phenomenology.
Contrary to the selective contents of con-
sciousness, the concept of the state of conscious-
ness  refers  to  an overall  pattern of  subjective
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psychological functioning that includes the to-
tality of phenomenal contents of consciousness
(Rosenthal 1986; Tart 1972). In addition to the
relaxed  waking  state  of  consciousness  in  a
healthy volunteer, which could be also regarded
as  a  baseline  state,  altered,  unconscious,  and
non-conscious  states  can  be  distinguished.  In
altered states of consciousness, such as dream-
ing or Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD) psy-
chomodulation, subjective experiences may un-
dergo various  perceptual  and cognitive  altera-
tions, the neural basis of which can be studied
by  contrasting  them with  a  baseline  state  of
consciousness, e.g., by comparing brain activity
before and after hallucinogen intake (Carhart-
Harris et  al. 2012).  Given  that  there  is  no
widely accepted definition and criterion for an
altered  state  of  consciousness  (Móró 2010;
Revonsuo et  al. 2009),  a  rather  common ap-
proach is to describe, classify, and study states
that are traditionally called  altered, avoiding a
single definition that would grasp the core of all
altered  states  of  consciousness  (Vaitl et  al.
2005). 
Contrary to the baseline and altered states
of  consciousness,  unconscious  states are  de-
prived of subjective experiences, but they may
still maintain the potential to become conscious.
For instance, an unconscious state of dreamless
sleep  may turn  into a conscious  sleep  once  a
sleeping participant begins to dream (for an al-
ternative  interpretation of  dreamless  seep,  see
Thompson this collection).  Finally,  noncon-
scious states are those completely deprived of a
capacity to support phenomenal consciousness,
such as an irreversible coma. In clinical neuros-
cience,  the  most  extensively  studied  contrast
between  a  pathological  altered  state  of  con-
sciousness and an unconscious or non-conscious
state is  a comparison between minimally con-
scious and vegetative state patients (Sitt et al.
2014).  When  states  of  (un)consciousness  are
contrasted, neural representations of specific ex-
periences are typically ignored, making it diffi-
cult or even impossible to assess the phenom-
enal specificity of findings, e.g., if participants
were  aware  of  particular  external  stimuli  or
what internally generated experiences they had.
Nevertheless, research into these states may re-
veal  neural  patterns  that  are  common  to  all
subjective  experiences  without  individuating
them. 
It  is  possible  that these two lines  of  re-
search may eventually reveal rather different, if
not independent, NCC systems: a neural correl-
ate of the state of consciousness and a neural
correlate  of  the  contents  of  consciousness
(Chalmers 2000).  If  these  exist,  any  neuros-
cientific  program  of  consciousness  research
would  be  incomplete  without  searching  for  a
state  NCC.  Furthermore,  even  if  a  separate
state NCC did not exist, there is currently no
evidence for this, and thus NCC research is in-
complete if it does not investigate this possibil-
ity.  This view is often dismissed on the basis
that some of the most plausible candidates for a
state  NCC,  such  as  the  brainstem  reticular
formation  (Merker 2007;  Parvizi &  Damasio
2001),  are  rather  low-level  neural  systems,
whereas  converging  evidence  shows  that  con-
sciousness is a cortical process (Singer this col-
lection). Furthermore, it could be argued that a
conscious state may be nothing more than the
sum of individual experiences, in which case re-
vealing  the  NCC  of  specific  contents  would
automatically  explain  the  state  NCC.  Yet  a
brief  analysis  of  the  fundamental  structural
properties  of  consciousness—see  the  following
section—shows that the necessary and sufficient
NCC cannot be revealed by an exclusive focus
on the contents of consciousness. Notably, the
arguments presented in this commentary will be
confined to the biological nature of human and
animal consciousness, and as such they are not
applicable to the problem of machine, extrater-
restrial, or silicon-brain consciousness.
3 Unity as the fundamental property of 
the stream of consciousness 
Given  that  subjective  experiences  can  accom-
pany almost any sensory, cognitive, emotional,
and behavioural function of the brain, phenom-
enal consciousness turns out to be an extremely
complex and multi-dimensional process. Never-
theless,  introspection  shows  that  despite  its
qualitative  richness,  phenomenal  consciousness
appears to us as a unified and coherent model
Noreika, V. (2015). It’s Not Just About the Contents: Searching for a Neural Correlate of a State of Consciousness - A Commentary on Wolf Singer.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 36(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570504 3 | 12
www.open-mind.net
of the external and internal environment (Bayne
2010; Revonsuo 2006). The continuity in the di-
versity of subjective experiences is famously re-
ferred to as the stream of consciousness (James
1890). This metaphor points to the unification
of  experiences occurring at different points in
time and space, which is achieved through tem-
poral and spatial binding. 
At the cognitive level of description, tem-
poral binding, i.e., integration of subjective ex-
periences over time, is realised through the per-
ception of  simultaneity, duration, and success-
iveness (Kiverstein 2010; Pöppel 1997). Percep-
tion of  simultaneity  may integrate several  ex-
periences, e.g., seeing a cat and hearing a bird-
song in the park, as occurring at the same time.
Perception  of  duration  of  selected  experiences
may  extend  them in  time,  e.g.,  the  birdsong
might seem to last for a certain period of time.
Finally, perception of successiveness may signal
the end of one temporally-extended experience,
and the beginning of another one, e.g., as the
cat reaches the bush and the birdsong ceases,
we may notice a cone under the bush. Notably,
the change does not typically involve all experi-
ences,  and as we are aware of some changing
contents, some other experiences continue to en-
dure in time, e.g., we still see the same bush. In
addition to the timing-specific functions,  tem-
poral  binding  seems  to  depend  on  the  iconic
memory that contains the just-experienced con-
tents of consciousness, and on the anticipation
of subsequent ones, forming the temporally-ex-
tended  phenomenal  experience  of  now,  some-
times referred to as the specious present (Dain-
ton 2006;  Kelly 1882).  Temporal  extension  of
subjective experiences have a simple,  yet very
important and often overlooked implication for
NCC research: if there is a single neural mech-
anism generating phenomenal consciousness, it
should be present as long as we are conscious of
at least one single content. Given that our ex-
periences do not cease at a fixed rate, i.e., some
are  shorter  and  some  longer,  and  that  the
change does not happen abruptly for all experi-
ences at once, the NCC should persist for the
duration of the stream of consciousness. Thus, a
temporary-confined correlate of awareness, such
as  a  negative  Event  Related  Potential  (ERP)
waveform briefly peaking at about 200ms from
the onset of visual stimuli (Railo et al. 2011),
cannot be a sufficient correlate of consciousness,
as awareness of visual contents lasts for a much
longer period of time.
Spatial binding, i.e., integration of subject-
ive experiences in space, is realised through sev-
eral  complimentary  processes,  through  which
each  subjective  experience  occupies  a  specific
location in relation to other experiences, which
is  sometimes  referred  to  as  location  binding
(Treisman 1996). In the baseline state of con-
sciousness, one experience never occurs in isola-
tion from other experiences; and when some ex-
periences cease, we do not experience emptiness,
because  other  experiences  fill  in  their  place.
Furthermore,  individual  experiences  are  spa-
tially integrated not only with respect to each
other in phenomenally external space, but also
with respect to the common egocentric reference
point (Revonsuo 2006). The reference point is
typically  located  in  the  phenomenal  head  or
chest, and all other experiences are realised in
the space as taking a certain distance and angle
from this point. While typical phenomenological
analysis of 3D space considers visual and audit-
ory experiences, it has recently been shown that
emotions  and feelings  are  also  experienced  as
taking certain location with respect to our body
parts (Nummenmaa et al. 2014). For instance,
anger  is  overrepresented  in  hands  and  arms
when  compared  to  sadness.  Arguably,  even
thoughts, which are often regarded as non-spa-
tial  entities  (Clarke 1995),  are usually experi-
enced as occurring within the head rather than
somewhere else. Given that the whole phenom-
enal space is bound together, the NCC should
also  represent  awareness  of  the  whole  space
rather than, for instance, selected regions on the
computer screen. That is, a promising candidate
for an NCC should not cease when a specific ex-
perience  vanishes  as  long  as  the  spatial  and
temporal unity of the stream of consciousness is
maintained.
So, what type of neural processes should
we be looking for when searching for the NCC?
If we take the unity of consciousness seriously,
we should be looking for a neural process that
steadily represents the whole phenomenal space,
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and sustains  its  activity  over  periods  of  time
longer than the existence of a single experience.
Arguably,  the  neural  correlate  of  unified  con-
sciousness cannot be discovered by studying and
contrasting only isolated contents of conscious-
ness, as the unity of spatiotemporal interactions
simply cannot be derived from solitary experi-
ences. Thus, while continuing to search for the
neural mechanisms of the contents of conscious-
ness, the NCC program should be extended by
carrying out systematic contrasts between un-
conscious, baseline, and/or altered states, which
would consider the whole stream of conscious-
ness.  A  possible  objection  to  this  proposal  is
that  the  unity  of  consciousness  is  not  funda-
mental in the strong form of  fundamentalism,
i.e., some forms of consciousness may still exist
despite the possible disintegration of its unity,
which  seems  to  happen  in  states  like  schizo-
phrenia, sleep onset,  or a minimally conscious
state. For instance, the stream of consciousness
may occasionally undergo a sudden, unpredict-
able alteration in terms of inner speech and im-
agery (Noreika et al. 2014). Nevertheless, if one
aims to explain the neural mechanisms of nor-
mal waking consciousness, the unity thesis, with
its  NCC-related  implications,  cannot  be  ig-
nored. With these considerations in mind, let us
examine now the proposal of global gamma syn-
chronisation  as  the  NCC  (Singer this collec-
tion).
4 Is gamma band synchrony sufficient 
and necessary for consciousness? 
A sufficient and necessary NCC (or perhaps a
set of NCCs) should be generic enough to cover
all  conscious  contents  and  states,  and  should
also be specific enough to cover only conscious
contents and states. Notably, gamma synchron-
isation does not meet the second specificity re-
quirement, as it can be associated with almost
any perceptual and cognitive function that de-
pends  on  the  formation  of  temporary  associ-
ations of distributed neuronal networks. Among
numerous  cases,  increased  gamma-band  syn-
chronisation is found to be associated with such
tasks  as  perceptual  learning  (Gruber et  al.
2002), self-paced movement (Pfurtscheller et al.
2003),  mental  rotation  (Bhattacharya et  al.
2001), viewing of unpleasant stimuli (Martini et
al. 2012),  deductive  reasoning  (Zhang et  al.
2014), auditory attention control (Doesburg et
al. 2012), face integration (Kottlow et al. 2012),
and memory encoding and retrieval (Osipova et
al. 2006).  Gamma-band  synchronisation  thus
seems be a generic process that contributes to
complex cortical computations involved in most
if not all of the higher cognitive functions (Fries
2009).
Singer (this collection) proposes that only
global,  widespread  synchronisation  of  gamma
oscillations  is  associated  with  consciousness,
whereas  local,  spatially-restricted  synchronisa-
tion is not necessary related to conscious aware-
ness. This might refute studies reporting local
synchrony;  however,  some  of  the  above-men-
tioned studies  found increased  global  gamma-
synchrony  when  observing  unpleasant  stimuli
(Martini et al. 2012) or carrying out a mental
rotation  task  (Bhattacharya et  al. 2001).  It
could be argued, though, that gamma synchron-
isation is present in these experiments as a cor-
relate  of  task-related  subjective  experiences,
such as awareness of memory retrieval. In fact,
even though most of these studies did not even
mention consciousness or awareness, their parti-
cipants were not unconscious, and gamma syn-
chronisation  could  have  been  associated  with
the task-dependent subjective experiences. Yet,
this line of reasoning is challenged by the simple
fact that participants remained conscious in all
contrast conditions throughout the experiments.
Why would  consciousness-related  gamma syn-
chronisation  increase  in  some,  but  not  other
conditions?  This  leads  us  to  the  question  of
what exactly gamma synchrony correlates with
in  studies  that  specifically  manipulate  aware-
ness? Let us take a closer look at two key stud-
ies, also examined by Singer (this collection).
Melloni et  al. (2007)  presented  pairs  of
words  and  asked  participants  to  report  on
whether both words were the same. Visibility of
the first word was manipulated by adjusting the
luminance  level  of  the  forward and backward
masks, which rendered the words visible only in
some  of  the  trials.  Global  gamma-phase  syn-
chronisation  between the fronto-centro-parietal
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electrodes  was  observed  within  the  40–182ms
time-window after the presentation of the first
word only in visible trials, which coincides with
the  time  when  conscious  perception  of  the
words is expected to emerge. In the latter time-
windows,  visible  words  were  marked  by more
localised  gamma synchronisation,  higher  P300
amplitude,  and  higher  amplitude  of  frontal
theta  oscillations  than  invisible  words.  These
findings confirmed that gamma synchronisation
is a correlate of visual-semantic awareness, and
showed that other electrophysiological processes
may also correlate with consciousness.
Doesburg et  al. (2009)  investigated  the
role  of  gamma-phase  synchronisation  in  con-
scious  awareness  using  a  binocular  rivalry
paradigm, in which a different visual stimulus is
presented to each eye.  Instead of  seeing both
stimuli at the same time, people report perceiv-
ing  only  one  of  the  stimuli  that  continues
switching in time. An increase in the gamma-
band  synchronisation  over  the  fronto-parietal
regions  was  observed  in  the  600–540ms  and
280–220ms time-windows before responses indic-
ating a perceptual switch. Assuming that reac-
tion time was about 250ms, the synchronisation
increase coincided with a new percept reaching
awareness. Interestingly, gamma synchronisation
oscillated  at  the  theta  rhythm,  suggesting  a
cross-frequency interaction. 
In both of these experiments (Doesburg et
al. 2009; Melloni et al. 2007), gamma synchrony
peaked  around  the  time  when  participants
began experiencing a new content of conscious-
ness,  following  which  Singer (this collection)
draws the well-justified conclusion that gamma
synchronisation is associated with a transfer of
the new contents into awareness. Given that in-
creased synchronisation may reflect the neural
and phenomenal binding required for the funda-
mental  unity  of  consciousness  to  emerge,  it
seems to be an ideal  candidate for the NCC.
Yet the duration of increased synchronisation is
relatively brief and seems to last a much shorter
time  than  the  awareness  of  stimuli.  For  in-
stance, P300 distinguished visible and invisible
words  around  300ms  post-stimulus,  whereas
gamma-band synchronisation became local dur-
ing this time-window (Melloni et al. 2007). Such
brevity of synchronisation suggests that it is in-
volved  only  in  the initial  binding  of  the  new
contents of consciousness, while a further main-
tenance of these contents is supported by other
neural mechanisms, in particular theta oscilla-
tions (Doesburg et al. 2009; Melloni et al. 2007;
Singer this collection).  Given  that  the  global
gamma synchronisation  correlates  with a  spa-
tially-  and  temporally-local  change  in  the
stream of consciousness, its association with an
overall unity of consciousness is uncertain and,
at least currently, it cannot be accounted as the
only or even as the major NCC. If it were such,
it  would not  cease as  long as the participant
were aware of a particular content of conscious-
ness. 
Furthermore,  gamma synchrony does not
seem to increase in response to each of the new
contents of consciousness. In each trial, Melloni
et al. (2007) presented a series of  stimuli,  in-
cluding a fixation cross, a masking noise, a tar-
get  word,  and  a  blank  screen.  Each  of  these
stimuli should have entered consciousness, and
even when the target word was unreadable, par-
ticipants should have perceived something, e.g.,
an  unreadable  word,  incoherent  letters,  or  a
flashing mask. However, the global gamma syn-
chronisation increased only in response to per-
ceived visible words, suggesting that it is a cor-
relate of the initial binding of a selected, expec-
ted, attended, coherent, task-relevant content of
consciousness. As such, in addition to the lack
of specificity, gamma synchrony does not seem
to be generic enough to cover all the different
contents  of  consciousness,  even  within  the
paradigmatic  visual  modality.  Thus,  it  seems
that  the  global  gamma  synchronisation  is
neither necessary not sufficient for consciousness
to emerge, as subjective experiences may exist
without gamma synchronisation, and even when
synchronisation is involved in the generation of
awareness, other neural processes are needed to
maintain its presence.
As discussed in the previous section, the
unity of consciousness emerges from the interac-
tion  of  all  experiences  available  at  a  time.
Gamma synchronisation cannot account for the
unity of a state of consciousness, simply because
it is involved only in the generation of new task-
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dependent  contents,  and  it  does  not  seem to
bind these contents within the broader stream
of consciousness. Arguably, instead of focusing
on selected stimuli, we may be able to detect
the neural correlates of the unity of conscious-
ness by contrasting states of consciousness with
unconsciousness,  since  such  a  contrast  would
consider the whole stream of phenomenal con-
tents, including their structural unity. 
5 Studying the contents and states of 
consciousness: Let’s probe them 
together!
Perhaps the most powerful contrast conditions
for studying a neural correlate of a state of con-
sciousness are comparisons between wakefulness
and slow-wave sleep, as well as between wake-
fulness and general anaesthesia. A notable clin-
ical contrast is a comparison between vegetative
state  and  minimally  conscious  state  patients.
Furthermore,  new paradigms  are  available  for
comparing  consciousness  with  unconsciousness
when an overall physiological state of the brain
is  controlled,  such  as  dreamless  vs.  dreamful
non-rapid  eye  movement  sleep  (NREM sleep;
Noreika et  al. 2009;  Siclari et  al. 2013)  or
dreamless vs. dreamful anaesthesia (Noreika et
al. 2011). Let us examine several exemplary pa-
pers  that  compare  an  overall  stream  of  con-
sciousness with its absence.
Sitt et al. (2014) studied auditory-evoked
potentials and endogenous fluctuations of EEG
signal in 75 vegetative state and 68 minimally-
conscious patients. None of the studied evoked
potentials  (P1,  MMN,  P3a,  P3b,  CNV)  were
able to discriminate patient groups, indicating
that task-dependent brain activity does not ne-
cessarily distinguish between conscious and un-
conscious states.  Contrary to this,  analyses of
spontaneous EEG activity showed that uncon-
scious patients had higher power of delta and
lower power of theta and alpha oscillations, es-
pecially  over  parietal  regions.  Furthermore,
EEG complexity indices derived from the com-
pressibility of a sequence of data points indic-
ated increased signal complexity over the pari-
etal region in the minimally conscious patients
compared to the vegetative state patients. Fi-
nally,  electrode  connectivity  measures  derived
from information  theory showed that  vegetat-
ive-state patients  had lower-weighted symbolic
mutual  information  exchange  in  the  range  of
theta  and  alpha  oscillations  than  minimally-
conscious  patients.  Interestingly,  none  of  the
EEG connectivity measures in the gamma fre-
quency  range,  including  phase  lag  index  and
imaginary coherence, could discriminate patient
groups,  coinciding with other  independent ob-
servations that gamma synchrony does not ne-
cessarily differentiate conscious and unconscious
states of the brain (Castro et al. 2013; Steriade
et al. 1996). 
The finding that the presence of conscious-
ness is associated with an overall complexity of
EEG  signal  and  the  magnitude  of  inter-elec-
trode  information  exchange  (Sitt et  al. 2014)
seems  to  support  the  information  integration
theory  of  consciousness  (Tononi 2012),  which
predicts that consciousness depends on informa-
tion complexity and integration in the system.
The information integration theory was recently
tested by Casali et al. (2013), who investigated
the consciousness-related electrodynamics of the
distributed cortical networks in a wide range of
states  of  (un)consciousness,  including wakeful-
ness  (eyes  open,  eyes  closed),  sleep  (NREM
sleep,  REM  sleep),  anaesthesia  (midazolam,
xenon,  propofol),  and  consciousness  disorders
(locked-in syndrome, minimally conscious state,
patients  who have  emerged from a  minimally
conscious state, vegetative state). In a series of
experiments,  transcranial  magnetic  stimulation
(TMS) pulses were delivered to different cortical
sites, which perturbed spontaneous EEG activ-
ity (Massimini et al. 2010). Complexity of such
TMS-induced EEG perturbations was then cal-
culated, and its index successfully differentiated
the states of consciousness and unconsciousness,
even at the individual participant’s level (Casali
et al. 2013). As predicted, the presence of con-
sciousness was associated with a higher level of
information complexity. 
In these and similar experiments, the con-
tents  of  consciousness  were not  systematically
manipulated  or  controlled  for,  and  conscious
participants  probably  underwent  very  diverse
experiences.  Consequently,  the  reported  EEG
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complexity as the NCC seems to be independ-
ent  of  particular  phenomenal  contents,  and it
may reflect some structural aspects of the whole
stream  of  unified  subjective  experiences.  It
seems  that  phenomenal  consciousness  emerges
in a state of the brain that is capable of gener-
ating the required level of information complex-
ity and integration. As requested in the previ-
ous sections, such an NCC is stable in time and
does not depend on an experience isolated from
the  rest  of  phenomenal  space.  Arguably,  this
type of study tackles the fundamental unity of
consciousness much more directly than typical
paradigms for studying the selected contents of
consciousness. However, approaching one side of
the bridge takes us further away from the other
side, and the better characterization we have of
the neural mechanisms of the state of conscious-
ness, the less we can say about the neural mech-
anisms of particular contents of consciousness.
For instance, the perturbational complexity in-
dex can differentiate conscious and unconscious
states,  but it  is  extremely insensitive when it
comes to distinguishing between different con-
tents of consciousness. For instance, the values
of the complexity index did not systematically
differ  between  the  “eyes  closed”  and  “eyes
open” conditions in the standard waking state
(Casali et  al. 2013;  Noreika 2014).  Arguably,
any NCC that cannot distinguish between ex-
periences  occurring  in  the  “eyes  closed”  and
“eyes open” conditions cannot be fully satisfact-
ory, as the quality of subjective experiences is
the core of the scientific problem of conscious-
ness. Yet even though informational complexity
does  not  reflect  qualities  of  phenomenal  con-
tents, it is a promising candidate for an NCC of
the background properties of consciousness that
enable the emergence of subjective experiences
and/or necessitate their structural unity.
We are thus left with studies of the con-
tents NCC, such as focusing on the gamma syn-
chrony, and studies of the state NCC, such as
focusing  on  the  information  complexity.  The
first  group  of  studies  seems  to  explain  the
neural binding of concrete selected contents of
consciousness, but it does not have a capacity
to  address  the  unity  of  consciousness.  The
second group seems to capture neural processes
involved in the whole stream of consciousness,
but it ignores differentiation or phenomenal di-
versity  of  consciousness.  Ideally,  research  into
the NCC would combine both of these comple-
mentary  approaches.  Unfortunately,  a  system-
atic combination of the contents- and states-fo-
cused paradigms is almost never tested in cog-
nitive neuroscientific studies of consciousness. 
The  combined  contents-states  paradigm
would contrast  baseline and altered states,  or
consciousness and unconsciousness, or the trans-
ition between the two, while participants carry
out experiments that tackle the neural mechan-
isms of  the contents  of  consciousness.  For  in-
stance, one could study binocular rivalry while
participants lose consciousness in response to an
anaesthetic  agent.  This  could,  for  instance,
provide data to investigate how global gamma
synchrony  as  a  correlate  of  the  binding  and
transfer of new contents to awareness depends
on or interacts with a changing level of neuronal
information complexity. Another promising av-
enue is research into awareness-related perform-
ance in the transition from wakefulness to sleep
(Goupil &  Bekinschtein 2011). In a recent at-
tempt,  Bareham et  al. (2014)  demonstrated
that healthy individuals show neglect-like loss of
awareness of the right side of their space in a
drowsy  state  of  consciousness.  Thus,  spatial
awareness  and  unity  seem  to  depend  on  the
state  of  alertness,  as  defined  by  the  relative
amplitude of theta and alpha oscillations, which
confirms that the contents are not wholly inde-
pendent of the state. That is, despite the ex-
ternal physical stimuli and environment remain-
ing  stable,  phenomenal  contents  may  appear,
disappear, or reorganise depending on the over-
all state of consciousness. More such studies are
expected to be carried out in future, aiming to
integrate the content NCC, the state NCC, and
altered  states  of  consciousness  research  pro-
grams under one unified framework of the con-
tent-state NCC research.
6 Conclusion
Global  gamma-band  synchronisation,  research
into which was largely triggered and continues
to be advanced by Prof. Wolf Singer, is one of
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the  most  promising  NCCs.  Synchronisation
seems to increase in most  cases  when a new,
task-dependent  content  of  consciousness  is
formed.  Yet a larger  number of  complications
prevents  its  acceptance  as  the  main  NCC,
namely: gamma synchronisation does not per-
sist for as long as the contents of consciousness,
some of  the  contents  of  consciousness  emerge
without  gamma  synchronisation  being  modu-
lated, and, finally, gamma synchronisation may
increase in  unconscious or unresponsive states
of  mind.  These  complications  show  that
gamma-band  synchronisation  cannot  fully  ac-
count for the existence of a unified stream of
consciousness. Given that consciousness is integ-
rated over cognitive time and space, a sufficient
and necessary NCC should persist  even when
some but not all of the experiences cease to ex-
ist in time, or change their location. Neverthe-
less, even though gamma-band synchronisation
seems to be neither necessary nor sufficient for
all contents of consciousness to arise, it should
be regarded as one of the NCCs specifically in-
volved in the binding of new attended experi-
ences.  Future research may also develop more
accurate  characterization  of  gamma synchron-
isation, including its spatial scale, precision, and
stability  (Singer this collection),  and  certain
forms of synchrony might be necessarily accom-
panied  by consciousness;  yet  such  evidence  is
not currently available. 
Given that gamma synchronisation cannot
be the only NCC, research efforts and resources
should  be  distributed  to  search  for  the  other
NCCs, some of which might be responsible for
the  maintenance  of  already-bound  single  con-
tents,  and some of  which might contribute to
the unity of the whole stream of consciousness.
Research paradigms should be  developed that
allow simultaneous manipulation and testing of
both  the  contents  and  the  states  of  (un)con-
sciousness.  Most likely,  none of the discovered
NCCs alone will be necessary and sufficient for
all forms of subjective experiences to exist. How
many of the neural correlates will be sufficient
for  the  stream  of  consciousness  to  flow,  and
whether the sufficient ones will also be neces-
sary, remains to be studied in future. For now,
an  exciting  program of  NCC research  should
continue searching for the new avenues. Among
various proposals, such as a focus on how social
interactions  and  culture  modulate  neural  net-
works supporting phenomenal contents (Singer
this collection), the present one claims that it’s
not just about the contents, and that a state of
consciousness deserves a treatment of its own.
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